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Though the U.S. government has strengthened its support for the Guard and Reserves since the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves released its final report in 2008, America still has not made the changes required to ensure that the Guard and Reserves can maximize their contributions to U.S. national security. It is time for the U.S. government to accelerate the transformation of the Guard and Reserves into the type of ready, capable and available operational force that will prove essential to protecting the United States at home and abroad throughout the 21st century. To help advance reform efforts, this report identifies and offers recommendations in five thematic areas where further progress is most urgently needed: roles and missions (including homeland response and civil support), readiness, cost, education and the "continuum of service" concept of flexible personnel management.
The Guard and Reserves are at a crossroads. Down one path lies continued transformation into a 21st-century operational force and progress on the planning, budgetary and management reforms still required to make that aspiration a reality. Down the other path lies regression to a Cold War-style strategic force meant only to be used as a last resort in the event of major war.
In past eras of fiscal restraint, Pentagon officials reduced the U.S. military's operational reliance on the Guard and Reserves and cut their budgets, in part due to the inherent tension between full-time active duty and reserve personnel. Such reflexive underutilization and downsizing today would squander the immense experience gained recently by the Guard and Reserves during their missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and the U.S. homeland. It would also forego the differentiated capabilities possessed by the Guard and Reserves that are uniquely suited for such vital missions as conducting post-conflict stabilization operations, building partner security capacity both at home and abroad, ensuring access to space and cyber domains, and providing homeland response and civil support to federal, state and local agencies in the wake of a catastrophic domestic incident. Now is an opportune time for the U.S. government to bridge the cultural, bureaucratic and budgetary gulf that still divides full-time active duty and reserve personnel. After a decade of war in which active duty and reserve troops served side-by-side, the sweat of shared sacrifice should wash away lingering rivalries, particularly among the younger generation of service members. Today, Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) should work together to strengthen the professional bond between full-time active duty and reserve personnel in order to build a more seamlessly integrated total force better prepared to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. 
General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (Ret.) is the president and chief operating officer of the Association of the United States Army. He served as chief of staff of the Army from 1991 to 1995. an Indispensable force Investing in America's National Guard and Reserves

S E P T E M B E R
E X E C U T I V E S U M M A Ry
Though the United States required more and more from its National Guard and Reserves after the Sept. 11 attacks, the U.S. government initially failed to recognize the fundamental changes needed to support Guardsmen and Reservists as they deployed repeatedly abroad and protected the homeland. Then, as use of the Guard and Reserves in Afghanistan and Iraq peaked in 2005, Congress created the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves and directed it to evaluate immediate wartime needs as well as enduring U.S. national security interests.
Between 2006 and 2008, the commission produced three reports that collectively presented the most comprehensive review of Guard and Reserves policy in the nation's history. The commission's final January 2008 report, featuring six major conclusions and 95 recommendations, concluded that the U.S. government had "no reasonable alternative" but to rely increasingly on the Guard and Reserves as an operational force that could participate routinely in ongoing military missions at home and abroad.¹ It urged the U.S. government to train, equip and manage the Guard and Reserves in a manner commensurate with their invaluable role in protecting the nation.
Two years later, how much progress has the U.S. government made toward implementing the commission's recommendations? To answer this critical question, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) partnered with the former commissioners to evaluate continuing challenges and to propose potential solutions. In June 2010, CNAS and the former commissioners convened off-the-record sessions to hear from current and former DOD and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials, senior military officers and congressional staffers. Additionally, seven nongovernmental policy experts presented independent assessments of progress on the commission's six major conclusions. CNAS and the former commissioners also conducted a thorough literature review, studied public statements and congressional testimony, and met with additional stakeholders in the House of Representatives, Senate, DOD, DHS and U.S. Northern Command.
On balance, the U.S. government has come a long way in developing a ready, capable and available operational Guard and Reserves. Policymakers deserve praise for their improvements during both the Bush and Obama administrations. DOD in particular has demonstrated a real commitment to reforming its policies in the ways prescribed by the commission. The Pentagon embraced the vast majority of the commission's recommendations (105 of 118 from all three reports) and revised its policies and doctrine accordingly.² In October 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued Directive 1200.17, which codified as official DOD policy that the Guard and Reserves "provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict."³ Through the support of Congress, readiness in training, equipment and medical and dental health improved, leaving service members better prepared for the grueling challenges of war. DOD and Congress are seeking more flexible options for Professional Military Education (PME), a vital reform that will help break down cultural barriers between full-time active duty and reserve personnel and create a more adaptive, cohesive and effective fighting force.
Despite Gates' assurance that the recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves "continue to be a high priority for the Department [of Defense]," the stress of two simultaneous wars and bureaucratic inertia are combining to slow further progress toward achieving the vision laid out both by the commission and Directive 1200.17.⁴ Lack of progress since 2008 in the critical areas listed below demonstrates that the U.S. government still is not investing sufficiently in the policies, laws and budgets required to enable the Guard and Reserves to fulfill their critical operational role in U.S. national security.
The U.S. government must further strengthen its weapon of mass destruction (WMD) response and consequence-management capabilities. Since 2008, the United States enhanced its ability to contain fallout and save lives in the event of a catastrophic disaster on U.S. soil. Nevertheless, DHS has not provided DOD with appropriate WMD response requirements, and poor planning, inadequate resources and interagency turf battles still hinder the ability of the Guard and Reserves to maximize their preparedness and effectiveness as a crisisresponse force.
The operational functions of the Guard and
Reserves continue to be financed through the "Overseas Contingency Operations" budget account that funds the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since this "supplemental" account will vanish as U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq wind down, the operational functions of the Guard and Reserves -which will prove essential in future missions requiring specialized and hightech skills -are at risk of disappearing along with it, particularly if overall defense spending tapers off an Indispensable force Investing in America's National Guard and Reserves S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 0 10 | as expected. DOD should fully fund the operational Guard and Reserves through the "base" budget, not the supplemental account, in order to make them a fully institutionalized element of America's strategy to overcome the security threats of the future.
Persistent equipment shortfalls continue to erode the readiness of the Guard and Reserves. The Air National Guard, Marine Corps Reserve, Army National Guard and Army Reserve all lacked at least 25 percent of their required equipment as of October 2009. When Guardsmen and Reservists do not posses and train on the modernized equipment they will use during deployments, pre-mobilization readiness declines, "boots on ground" time in theater decreases, morale plummets and the flexibility to reassign units from one mission to another disappears.
Physical, psychological, emotional and familial wounds continue to run deep for many service members. In a reversal from previous years, Army Guardsmen and Reservists through July 2010 committed suicide more frequently this year than their active duty counterparts. Civilian Guardsmen and Reservists also continue to face a challenging job market, which adds additional stress and uncertainty to the pressure of continuing deployments. Since the U.S. military is only as strong as the people wearing the uniforms -and the families, friends and employers supporting them -these are indeed disturbing signs that demand immediate attention.
The U.S. government has made little progress implementing the "continuum of service" concept of flexible 21st-century personnel management. DOD still lacks a comprehensive personnel management strategy. Moreover, the services have recommended few changes in their promotion policies, and excessive duty statuses governing Guard and Reserve personnel (e.g. mobilization authority under U.S. code, voluntary vs. involuntary commitment, active vs. inactive duty) continue to disrupt successful receipt of pay, benefits and health care by Guardsmen and Reservists.
Many senior policymakers and active duty officers remain uninformed about the Guard and Reserves. Compounded by lingering anti-Guard and Reserves bias among some full-time active duty personnel, this lack of awareness damages active-reserve unity by stifling improvements that could result from reformed PME curricula and attendance policies, as well as a strengthened commitment to the continuum of service.
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) did not include a legally required assessment of the future roles and missions of the Guard and Reserves. Because the QDR establishes DOD's future strategic and budgetary priorities, the omission minimized the relevance of the Guard and Reserves beyond the current conflicts and perpetuated DOD's historical reluctance to think presciently about their role in U.S. national security strategy. A forthcoming DOD review of the Guard and Reserves should ameliorate the situation, but the Guard and Reserves will nevertheless remain behind the curve in terms of long-range planning initiated by the QDR.
DOD still lacks an agreed-upon method for comparing the relative costs of full-time active duty and reserve personnel. This methodological gap leaves DOD at risk of making future force structure decisions based not on cost-benefit analysis, but on the sporadic yet recurring anti-Guard and Reserves cultural bias that motivated previous DOD attempts to reflexively slash the Guard and Reserves when defense budgets decline.⁵ As this report will demonstrate, allowing the Guard and Reserves to regress back to a Cold War-style strategic force meant only to be used as a last resort in the event of major war would be a tremendous mistake that would damage U.S. national security. In fact, the longer the U.S. government takes to fully transition the Guard and Reserves into an operational force for the future, the more likely it becomes that funding for doing so will vanish as the DOD budget flattens or contracts over the next five years. This potential outcome would leave the United States without the invaluable protection provided by a fully supported Guard and Reserves. To avoid such dangerous vulnerability, the U.S. government should accelerate the necessary transformation of the Guard and Reserves into a 21st-century operational force by making improvements in the five thematic areas outlined by this report: roles and missions (including homeland response and civil support), readiness, cost, education and the continuum of service. 
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Allowing the Guard and
The U.S. government will not enact future policies or apportion future resources based solely on the reserve component's wartime contributions over the past decade. Unless policymakers coalesce around a shared vision for the reserve component's role in overcoming the security threats of the 21st century -that is, unless the question of "Why do we need an operational reserve component?" is answered convincingly -momentum toward an operational Guard and Reserves will dissipate. If that happens, the valuable capabilities possessed by Guardsmen and Reservists will disappear as they retire from a U.S. military in which they are underutilized.¹¹ As U.S. policymakers assess the future role of the Guard and Reserves, they should consider the approach other countries take toward their own reserve forces. Many powerful nations no longer manage their reserves as strictly strategic assets meant only to be used in the event of major war. Canada, Australia, Japan, Israel and the nations of Western Europe now rely on their reserves as essential operational components within their total military forces.
China, a nation whose military modernization concerns U.S. policymakers, notably incorporates approximately 500,000 to 800,000 reservists directly into its order of battle, requires reserve units to train alongside active duty forces and is devoting more funding and time to reserve training and equipment. In recent years, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) increasingly has recruited civilian reservists who lack prior military service but possess high-tech skills with military applicability. Reservists employed in the chemical industry serve in PLA chemical warfare units, and telecommunications workers serve in units specializing in information warfare and information operations. These highly skilled reservists play a growing role in China's technology-dependent national security strategy of using sophisticated cyber and electronic attacks to degrade battle networks, forward bases and maritime forces, thereby inhibiting a potential adversary's power projection capabilities.¹² The 2010 QDR did not provide a comprehensive vision for the reserve component's role in U.S. national security strategy. It stated:
Prevailing in today's wars requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity -available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment. Preventing and deterring conflict will likely necessitate the continued use of some elements of the Reserve Component -especially those that possess highdemand skill sets -in an operational capacity well into the future … The challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require us to employ National Guard and Reserve forces as an operational reserve to fulfill requirements for which they are well-suited in the United States and overseas. For example, the National Guard often serves at the forefront of DoD operations.¹³ On the positive side, the QDR codified the "likely" need for an operational reserve component "well into the future," including in "preventing and deterring conflict," one of the QDR's four priority objectives. Inclusion under this objective confirms that the Guard and Reserves will play an operational role in future missions, not just in today's wars. On the negative side, the QDR did not identify which specific roles and missions the Guard and Reserves might fulfill. Instead, it vaguely posited that "some elements" of the reserve component, especially those with "high-demand skill sets," are needed "to fulfill requirements for which they are well-suited." But this begs the questions: which elements, which skill sets and which requirements? According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), by specifying neither the reserve component's future roles and missions, nor the corresponding strength, capabilities or equipment needed to perform them, the QDR neglected to directly address one of the 17 reporting items required by law.1⁴
To compensate for this omission, the QDR pledged a comprehensive DOD review of both the future of the reserve component and the balance between active and reserve forces. DOD will release the review, currently being led by Gen James Nonetheless, DOD's specific homeland roles and responsibilities remain unclear to many of the Pentagon's federal and state agency partners, especially during scenarios demanding the fully integrated commitment of civilian and military resources. In March 2010, the GAO reported that key DOD planning documents on interagency coordination for homeland response and civil support missions are "outdated, not integrated, or not comprehensive."⁴¹ GAO found that outdated DOD policies and guidance, which are inconsistent and misaligned for civil support missions, complicate efforts to identify capability gaps and preposition equipment and supplies.⁴² Many DOD officials mistakenly believe that departmental policy prevents the reserve component from procuring or maintaining supplies, materiel or equipment exclusively devoted to the civil support mission. In reality, however, the policy merely requires the secretary of defense to authorize these preparations beforehand.⁴³ Such misunderstandings clearly hinder the reserve component's ability to maximize its preparedness and effectiveness as a crisis-response force.
After the tragic domestic disasters of the past decade, the American public now holds a "zero tolerance" attitude toward delayed or mismanaged disaster response by the federal government. As a result, the Guard and Reserves today must be trained, equipped and organized to respond rapidly and flawlessly. To advance these objectives, the U.S. government urgently needs to take the following actions to protect the homeland:
As the QDR Independent Review Panel 
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In contrast to a strictly strategic reserve component, an operational Guard and Reserves must be trained and equipped to a higher standard of readiness in order to serve routinely in such challenging missions as conducting post-conflict stabilization operations, building partner security capacity, ensuring access to space and cyber domains, and responding after crippling domestic disasters.
Proper preparation for these demanding activities requires, as the final report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves put it, "an enduring commitment to invest in the readiness of the reserve components."⁴⁵ Today, however, Pentagon planners hesitate to make enduring investments at a time when the future defense budget is expected to grow slowly (if at all) and is beset internally by rising personnel, operations and maintenance, and procurement costs, as well as externally by ballooning federal non-defense mandatory spending on Social Security and Medicare.⁴⁶ To choose wisely among force structure options, as opposed to reflexively slashing the Guard and Reserves if and when defense budgets decline, the Pentagon must understand the status and future readiness requirements of the operational reserve component, which offers a cost-effective option for managing many national security challenges. While all of the reserve components continue to suffer from equipment shortages, the ground forces and the Air National Guard suffer disproportionately. "The reality is current operations are consuming Army Reserve readiness as fast as we can build it," the 2010 Army Reserve Posture Statement noted.⁵⁴ The Army Reserve needs approximately 11 billion dollars through FY 2016 for procurement because only 65 percent of its equipment on hand is modernized, a shortfall that erodes pre-mobilization readiness.⁵⁵ Air National Guard aircraft are on average 29 years old, and 80 percent of the Air Force's air sovereignty alert force for homeland defense (a mission almost exclusively assigned to the Air National Guard) will reach the end of its service life in seven years.⁵⁶ This impending "age out" is creating anxiety as existing Air National Guard F-16 aircraft units wonder whether they will receive F-35 aircraft, newer F-16s or be forced to transition into other missions such as unmanned aircraft systems, intelligence or cyber operations.⁵⁷ Though senior Pentagon officials recognize the need to fully fund the equipment needs of the reserve component given its enhanced role as an operational force, persistent equipment shortfalls continue to erode the reserve component's readiness. "Since the Guard was considered in the past a strategic reserve, it was a lower priority for funding. That has changed," Gates observed in 2008.⁵⁸ "Today, the standard is that the Guard and Reserves receive the same equipment as the active force," he later added.⁵⁹ Despite this public commitment, however, the Air National Guard, Marine Corps Reserve, Army National Guard and Army Reserve all lacked at least 25 percent of their required equipment at the beginning of FY 2010 (see Table 1 ).⁶⁰ When Guardsmen and Reservists do not possess and train on the modernized equipment they will use during deployments, pre-mobilization readiness declines, "boots on ground" time in theater decreases, morale plummets and the flexibility to reassign units from one mission to another disappears. Such conditions are unacceptable in the an Indispensable force Investing in America's National Guard and Reserves for an operational reserve component or fully incorporated the resources needed to support the operational role into its budget and projected spending plan."⁶⁹ According to GAO, the Army also lacks a concrete plan that outlines requirements and monitors progress on transitioning to an operational Guard and Reserves. The lack of such evaluable metrics means that "DOD decision makers and Congress will not be in a sound position to determine the total costs to complete the transition and decide how to best allocate future funding," GAO concluded.⁷⁰ The Army is not the only service with underdeveloped plans, and such uncertainty does not bode well for stable, predictable funding of an operational reserve component in DOD's future base budgets.
S E P T E M B E R
Behind these budgetary difficulties lies the critical challenge of comparing the relative cost of the active and reserve components. Without a precise understanding of the cost difference between the components, DOD risks making future force structure decisions based not on cost-benefit analysis, but on sporadic yet recurring anti-reserve cultural bias that motivated previous DOD attempts to reflexively slash the Guard and Reserves when defense budgets decline.
Analysts have spilt much ink trying to calculate how much Guardsmen and Reservists cost compared to their active duty counterparts.⁷¹ The reserve component's lower operational and training tempo, reduced part-time pay and benefits, and smaller infrastructure requirements (such as for family housing) help keep its costs down. As the 2010 QDR concluded, effective use of the Guard and Reserves "will lower overall personnel and operating costs, better ensure the right mix and availability of equipment, provide more efficient and effective use of defense assets, and contribute to the sustainability of both the Active and Reserve components."⁷² This finding corroborated the work done previously by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, which conducted a thorough examination and concluded that an active component service member costs approximately four times more than a reserve component service member when he or she is not activated.⁷³
As discussed above, however, maintaining the readiness of today's operational reserve component costs significantly more than the strictly strategic force of the past. Pentagon officials confirm that there is still no generally accepted approach to determining the relative cost of the Guard and Reserves compared to active duty personnel. Reserve component leaders are still forced to answer questions regularly about the cost-effectiveness of the Guard and Reserves despite the fact that senior DOD leaders and numerous studies have stated repeatedly that the reserve component offers a significant return on investment given the unique abilities it brings to the total force.
To resolve lingering uncertainty about current reserve component costs and to improve decision making about force structure tradeoffs, the forthcoming DOD review of the future of the reserve component intends to establish a baseline costing methodology and to identify instances where such a baseline is not feasible. If the baseline permits each service to employ its own unique cost methodology, however, senior leaders will not be presented with "apples to apples" cost comparisons that allow them to weigh tradeoffs across the joint force. Furthermore, if the baseline concludes that the Guard and Reserves do in fact offer a costeffective force structure option, but the conclusion is perceived as emanating from the reserve component community -which could happen given that the assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs is co-chairing the review -stakeholders opposed to an increased role for the Guard and Reserves may simply disregard the findings.
In light of these realities, DOD or Congress should obtain an independent and comprehensive analysis that compares the cost and value of the active and reserve components using a variety of up-to-date assumptions. At minimum the analysis should review, and thereby add greater legitimacy to, the methodology being developed in DOD's forthcoming reserve component study. GAO or the Congressional Budget Office are excellent organizations to conduct such an analysis because of their impartiality and rigor. Both DOD's methodology and the independent analysis should seek to adhere to the following guidelines:
Minimize use of methodologies tailor-made • for individual services or components that can obscure "apples to apples" cost comparisons across the joint force.
Assess the cost of the Guard and Reserves rela-• tive to the readiness levels they must sustain for deployment and the rotational policies under which they are called up for duty in order to paint a realistic picture of the overall cost of an operational Guard and Reserves.
Determine the cost of the reserve component • in both its operational and strategic roles, along with lifetime career costs and infrastructure support, in order to capture both the value and burden of the Guard and Reserves to the American taxpayer.
Gauge the cost when reserve component capa-• bilities are used as the "force of first choice" in missions for which they are well suited.
Consider the cost-effectiveness and value of • alternative active-reserve force mixes in order to break inertia's historical stranglehold on force structure decisions. Education is the most effective way to overcome the lingering active-reserve component cultural divide. When active duty personnel study reserve component policy during their PME or sit next to Guardsmen and Reservists during their classes, misperceptions and biases are broken down on both sides. This can lead to greater cross-component respect, trust and cohesiveness -effects that translate into enhanced fighting power. DOD must reform both PME curricula and PME attendance to ensure that the active and reserve components get the chance to bridge their cultural divide not only on battlefields abroad but also in classrooms back in the United States.
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While many of the service and joint colleges do incorporate reserve component material into their curricula, the depth and breadth vary and few of the institutions offer a course exclusively devoted to the Guard and Reserves. In response to the commission's recommendation to increase exposure to Guard and Reserves issues at all levels of PME, the services responded that they feel their course material is sufficient.⁸¹ Given the rapidly evolving role of the reserve component, however, this sufficiency will disappear swiftly unless college administrators and faculty members dedicate themselves to keeping up. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should propose the reserve component as a "Special Area of Emphasis," a designation that would elevate its importance to service and joint colleges, in order to catalyze greater incorporation of Guard and Reserves material into PME curricula.⁸² Though increased exposure to reserve component material will help narrow the active-reserve divide, the greatest influence on one's educational experience is often the students, instructors and learning environment, not the formal curriculum. When active duty and reserve service members debate one another in seminars, carpool together to class and socialize together on weekends, prejudices are transcended much faster and more effectively than by merely reading textbooks. Several recent reports concluded that diverse experience, education and training are instrumental to developing officers prepared for the challenges of the 21st century.⁸³ Yet getting Guardsmen and Reservists into the classroom to share their diverse experience, education and training can be arduous and costly. Many Guardsmen and Reservists must fit PME in between their civilian jobs, military training, deployments and families. As a result, they often select distance (i.e. nonresidential, Internet-based) learning to accomplish their PME requirements. This is understandable and completely justified. However, many Guardsmen and Reservists also want to attend PME in-residence but cannot do so because of lack of space. As Lt Gen Harry Wyatt, director of the Air National Guard, told Congress in April 2010: "We see Guardsmen who, as we become more operational, decide in their lives that they have more time to spend in-residence, so we're looking for increased residence seats to help us with our PME."⁸⁴ This growing interest, which should increase as Guardsmen and Reservists recover from the strains of Afghanistan and Iraq, belies the oft-repeated assertion that reserve component service members' civilian careers cannot 
Reforming the organizations and Institutions that support an operational Reserve
survive time away for PME. Such claims ignore both the relatively short duration of many PME courses and the discordance in asserting that Guardsmen and Reservists cannot find time for in-residence PME but can somehow find time for year-long combat tours.
As reserve component officers have gained more chances recently to earn designation as jointqualified, including through the addition of approximately 1,400 part-time reserve component positions to the Joint Manpower Information System, DOD has not provided a concomitant increase in Joint PME (JPME) opportunities that actually entail face-to-face interaction between active duty and reserve service members.⁸⁵ For example, the Marine Corps is allocated 24 slots per year in the Advanced JPME (AJPME) program, but it received 62 applications from Reservists to attend in 2008 and 56 in 2009.⁸⁶ Furthermore, while the distance-learning APJME program allows more mid-level reserve component officers to earn JPME II credit, no active duty officers attend the program and it therefore fails to cultivate the personal relationships crucial to improving active-reserve unity. DOD is currently seeking to alter the JPME II-granting Joint and Combined Warfighting School program, currently a 10-week in-residence course for mid-level officers, so that it offers a hybrid mix of distance-learning and in-person seminars more conducive to Guard and Reserves officer attendance. This promising approach deserves the full support of the Office of Management and Budget, which is now considering the proposal.
To improve in-residence JPME opportunities at the highest leadership levels, Congress should pass legislation requiring reserve component officers selected for general or flag officer rank to attend CAPSTONE, the in-residence course required for newly minted active duty general and flag officers. Some associated with CAPSTONE argue that such an expansion will not work logistically because classes must stay small. But this logistical barrier seems surmountable given the importance of instilling cross-component unity in leaders who will soon serve together operationally as general and flag officers. For example, CAPSTONE could be held more times per year or broken into two classes (with active duty and reserve component personnel in both classes) as more Guardsmen and Reservists enrolled.
Improving balance between the active and reserve components in PME today is as important as cultivating inter-service jointness in PME was 25 years ago. While the availability and use of in-residence PME slots will always vary by service and by each reserve component service member's personal circumstances, the need and desire for these slots will grow at every level of PME -from specialty schools to staff colleges to war colleges to CAPSTONE -as the Guard and Reserves become more operational. 
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The "continuum of service," a set of laws and policies providing career flexibility, will allow the U.S. military to recruit and retain the most talented people from a 21st-century workforce in which individuals do not expect to work at the same company for 40 years, but instead prefer diverse experiences with varying levels of intensity over time.⁸⁸ Tapping into this talented and mobile workforce will prove essential to fielding a U.S. military versed in the overlapping political, economic and technological lines of effort required for success in future military operations.⁸⁹ Under a fully implemented continuum of service, the only decisive factors in personnel decisions will be the quality of the person and the mission at hand.
Properly understood, the continuum of service does not apply only to the Guard and Reserves, as it must also apply to active duty service members in order to become a true continuum. GEN George C. Marshall illustrated the spirit of the continuum of service by moving between active and reserve component assignments on his way up the career ladder.
The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves called for a more flexible military career advancement system based on the development of competencies rather than the current "up or out" time-based system designed in the wake of World War II. As with the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which clarified the military chain of command and helped integrate the services, the U.S. government cannot -and should not -make these changes overnight.
Yet DOD has not made enough progress instituting the principles of the continuum of service since the commission issued its final report in 2008. The services recommended few changes in their promotion policies, although DOD did commission a RAND study to scrutinize the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA), the statutes governing promotion policies and requirements.⁹⁰ Without making these statutes more flexible and more based on acquired knowledge, skills and abilities -not merely time spent in a rank -the movement between active and reserve components envisioned by the continuum of service is not realistic because such mobility is still perceived as representing a "kiss of death" for active duty officers seeking promotion. Once RAND submits its study, Congress should amend DOPMA and ROPMA accordingly. In the interim DOD should, to the extent possible under existing law, revise its current policy directives and instructions dictating time-based promotions to instead permit advancement that varies based on career field and competitive category (i.e. competencies).
A promising pilot program featuring more flexible service options was unveiled this year by Representative Ike Skelton, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Skelton introduced an amendment to the FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act that would authorize a pilot program "to evaluate [an] alternative career track for commissioned officers to facilitate an increased commitment to academic and professional education and career-broadening assignments."⁹¹ The service secretaries could offer officers with between 13 and 18 years of service the opportunity to participate in this alternative track, with each secretary authorized to select up to 50 officers per year. In explaining his amendment, Skelton noted that "this holistic vision of officer development requires a diverse and flexible career path that does not exist in today's personnel system that is marked by mandatory retirement standards and a rigid up-or-out policy."⁹² As this program or similar initiatives As military service becomes more adaptable, the U.S. government must erect systems to support service members throughout their entire careers. Improvements are most needed on duty status reform and creating an integrated pay and personnel system, which will provide logistical continuity consistent with the continuum of service concept.
Comptrollers within DOD and the services, along with congressional appropriations staffers, reportedly oppose simplifying the 29 duty status categories, which complicate benefits and operational accessibility, because doing so will make an Indispensable force Investing in America's National Guard and Reserves An integrated pay and personnel system also continues to elude DOD. After 12 years and 1 billion dollars spent on development, DOD cancelled a plan in 2010 to bring all four services under a single payroll and personnel records scheme known as the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS).⁹⁴ The cancellation is not necessarily a bad outcome given that DIMHRS probably never would have worked as intended, but DOD wasted valuable time and resources in the drawn out development process. Senior DOD leaders should devote high-level attention to this issue and direct the testing and deployment of service pay and personnel systems to proceed apace. Without improvements in duty statuses and pay systems, the continuum of service will remain a logistical impossibility.
S E P T E M B E R
If fully embraced, the continuum of service will transcend cultural barriers and foster a unified force that provides the U.S. military with the most qualified people possessing the most relevant skills -regardless of which component they serve in. By making service more flexible and more attuned to the variability of the 21st-century workforce, the continuum of service promises to attract and retain talented individuals possessing skills the U.S. military needs to overcome the security threats of the future.
I X . CO N C LU S I O N
Since 2008, the U.S. government has taken great strides to support the National Guard and Reserves in a manner consistent with their current and future importance to the nation. DOD in particular has demonstrated real commitment to reforming its policies in the ways prescribed by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. Given the depth and breadth of the commission's work, however, it will take years of sustained commitment and enduring investment by the U.S. government to fulfill the commission's overarching vision of a fully supported 21st-century operational reserve component.
The U.S. government should not allow this opportune moment, when the reserve component's wartime experience makes it more combat capable than ever before, to lapse without making further progress on implementing the commission's unaccomplished recommendations. DOD and Congress should address the challenges posed by roles and missions (including homeland response and civil support), readiness, cost, education and the continuum of service by cooperating to strengthen the professional bond between active and reserve component personnel in order to build a more seamlessly integrated total force. Doing so will ensure that the costeffective National Guard and Reserves can fulfill their role as an indispensable force for defending U.S. sovereign territory and protecting America's security interests around the world.
